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Abstract—In this paper, we combine sectorized transmission
with artificial noise to establish secrecy in decentralized wire-
less networks. The locations of the legitimate nodes and the
eavesdroppers are both modeled by homogeneous Poisson point
processes. Using sectorized antennas, each legitimate transmitter
sends an information signal in the sector which contains its
intended receiver, while simultaneously emitting artificial noise in
other sectors, in order to provide secrecy against the eavesdrop-
pers. We first separately characterize the reliability performance
of the legitimate link and the secrecy performance against mali-
cious eavesdropping. Then, we derive the secrecy transmission
capacity to measure the networkwide secrecy throughput. To
facilitate the practical system design, we provide a sufficient
condition, in terms of the system parameters and constraints,
under which a positive secrecy transmission capacity is achiev-
able. The optimal transmit power allocation between the infor-
mation signal and the artificial noise for achieving the maximal
secrecy transmission capacity is also investigated. Our analysis
indicates that sectorized transmission provides significant secrecy
enhancements in decentralized wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the task of ensuring privacy and security of the
data transmitted in wireless networks is becoming increas-
ingly important. The continuing development of computing
devices has undermined the traditional cryptographic security
mechanisms. The recently emerged physical-layer security
techniques [1, 2] offer enhanced data security, regardless of
the eavesdroppers’ computational capability, and it has been
introduced into decentralized wireless networks to provide
improved secrecy performance [3–8].
Much of the literature on secrecy in decentralized networks
can be classified into three categories based on the used
performance metric and the modeling of the eavesdroppers.
For the first category, the secure connectivity performance
was inspected in the absence of interference (e.g., [3, 4]). For
the second category, the secrecy throughput performance was
investigated and the interference from other transmitting nodes
was taken into consideration. The eavesdroppers therein were
assumed to be incapable of resolving concurrent transmissions,
hence simply treating them as interference (e.g., [5]). This
assumption is often too optimistic and the designed system
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might be vulnerable if eavesdroppers with multi-user decod-
ability (such as successive interference cancellation) are trying
to intercept. As a more robust approach, in the last category,
the secrecy rate/throughput performance was studied under a
worst-case assumption that the eavesdroppers are capable of
multi-user decoding (e.g., [6–8]).
In decentralized networks, if the eavesdroppers are capable
of multi-user decoding, the interference caused by concur-
rent transmissions of information signals can potentially be
resolved by the eavesdroppers. To provide secrecy in this
challenging scenario, the aforementioned studies [6–8] intro-
duced artificial noise [9] and jamming signals [10, 11] into
decentralized networks, creating non-resolvable interference
to the eavesdroppers. Specifically, in [6], the legitimate users
which are far away from the intended receiver are selected to
emit artificial noise; in [7], a certain percentage of legitimate
users are randomly chosen to radiate jamming signals. Note
that with single antenna transmission, as in [6, 7], some
legitimate users have to stop their own message transmission,
in order to deliver artificial noise or jamming signals.
With sectorized antennas [12, 13], independent signals can
be transmitted in different sectors simultaneously. Here, as a
means of conquering eavesdroppers with multi-user decodabil-
ity, we propose to use sectorized transmission such that each
transmitter sends an information signal in the sector containing
its intended receiver, while simultaneously radiating artificial
noise in other sectors to help provide secrecy for the entire
network. In this way, no legitimate users need to sacrifice their
own message transmission, which is a considerable advantage
over the case of single antenna transmission [6, 7].
In this paper, we study the proposed artificial-noise-aided
sectorized transmission in decentralized wireless networks. We
start by characterizing the probability of connection outage
on the legitimate link and the possibility of secrecy outage
against malicious eavesdropping. Then, we derive the secrecy
transmission capacity to measure the networkwide throughput
of secure transmissions. After that, we provide a sufficient
condition on the system parameters and constraints, under
which a positive secrecy transmission capacity is achievable.
Finally, we optimize the power allocation between the infor-
mation signal and the artificial noise to maximize the secrecy
transmission capacity. Our analysis clearly shows that sector-
ized transmission provides significant secrecy enhancements
in decentralized wireless networks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a decentralized wireless network, with nodes
randomly distributed on a 2-dimensional plane R2. The legiti-
mate transmitters and the malicious eavesdroppers are modeled
by two independent homogeneous Poisson point processes
(PPPs) ΦL and ΦE with densities1 λl and λe, respectively.
Following the commonly-used network model [14], we assume
that each transmitter has an intended receiver at distance
r in a random direction. Each transmitter is equipped with
N directional transmit antennas, while each receiver (both
legitimate and malicious) has only one omnidirectional re-
ceive antenna. In addition to Rayleigh fading, the distance
attenuation is modeled by a path-loss exponent α > 2.
We further assume that each legitimate receiver has perfect
knowledge of the channel to the associated transmitter, while
the malicious eavesdroppers have the channel knowledge to
any transmitter they wish to intercept. Compared with the
aggregated interference, the local thermal noise is assumed
to be negligible and thus the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
will be used to measure the system performance.
A. Sectorized Transmission with Artificial Noise
With N directional antennas, the transmitters are capable
of sending independent signals in N disjoint sectors, each of
these covering 2piN radians with an antenna gain G. The antenna
gain usually increases as the spread angle decreases. As done
in [4], we assume that the sidelobes are suppressed sufficiently
and thus can be omitted in later analysis. This sectorized
transmission has been widely used to improve the connectivity
performance in decentralized wireless networks [12, 13].
As discussed in Section I, we consider the following scheme
to combine sectorized transmission with artificial noise: Each
transmitter sends an information signal in the sector containing
its intended receiver, while simultaneously emitting artificial
noise in all other sectors, creating non-resolvable interference
to the malicious eavesdroppers. Note that this transmission
scheme requires to know the direction of the intended receiver
and this information can be obtained through discovery mech-
anisms, such as those developed in [13].
The total transmit power at each transmitter is denoted by P .
Define φ as the ratio of the power of the information signal
to the total transmit power. Thus, the power allocated to the
information signal is PT = Pφ, while the power allocated to
the artificial noise is PJ = P (1− φ). With the antenna gain,
in the intended sector, information signal is transmitted with
power GPT , while in each of the other N−1 sectors, artificial
noise is radiated with power GPJN−1 .
We assume that the legitimate receivers are just common
receivers and do not apply any multi-user decoding techniques.
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is an assumption made on behalf of the designer: If the target is to separate
the network from a known one (e.g., hide a military network from a civilian
one), the designer should have access to the density of the known network.
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Thus, the interference at the legitimate receivers consists of the
information signals and the artificial noise. On the other hand,
we assume that the eavesdroppers are capable of multi-user
decoding, i.e., resolving concurrent transmissions. In order
to design the network parameters to achieve the maximum
level of secrecy, as done in [6–8], we consider a worst-
case assumption to overestimate the eavesdroppers’ multi-user
decodability: For the signal reception at any eavesdropper,
only the artificial noise constitutes the interference, whereas
the received information signals are resolvable and hence are
not part of the interference.
B. Wiretap Coding and Outage Definition
Before transmission, the data are encoded using the wire-
tap code [1]. The codeword rate and the message rate are
denoted as Rb and Rs, respectively. The rate redundancy
Re := Rb −Rs is intentionally added to provide secrecy.
More discussions on code construction can be found in [15].
If the channel from the transmitter to the intended receiver
cannot support the codeword rate Rb, then the receiver may
not be able to decode the message correctly, and we consider
this as a connection outage event.
There are possibly several eavesdroppers trying to intercept
the same transmitter, while the exact number of them is
unknown. To minimize the assumption on the eavesdroppers’
behavior and design for a worst case, we consider the scenario
where all eavesdroppers are trying to decode the message from
the transmitter under consideration. Therefore, if the channel
from the transmitter to any of the eavesdroppers can support
a data rate larger than the introduced rate redundancy Re,
this transmission fails to achieve perfect secrecy and a secrecy
outage is deemed to occur [7].
III. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the outage performance of
the legitimate link and the eavesdropping link, by deriving and
inspecting the connection outage probability and the secrecy
outage probability, respectively.
A. Connection Outage Probability
Here, we drive the connection outage probability pco to
measure the probability that the intended link cannot support
the selected codeword rate. To this end, we focus on a typical
transmitter-receiver pair and put the receiver at the origin
of the coordinate system. From Slivnyak’s theorem [16], the
distribution of all other nodes’ locations will not be affected;
thus, the obtained statistics can reflect the system performance
accurately. For the typical receiver, the interfering nodes
can be classified into two classes: i) interferers transmitting
information signals toward the origin; ii) interferers sending
artificial noise toward the origin. With such a classification,
the transmitters in ΦL can be divided into two independent
homogeneous PPPs, which are denoted by ΦT and ΦJ with
densities 1N λl and
N−1
N λl, respectively [16].
For the typical receiver, the aggregated interference from
the transmitters in ΦT and ΦJ is given by
IT = GPT
∑
x∈ΦT
SxoD
−α
xo , IJ =
GPJ
N − 1
∑
x∈ΦJ
SxoD
−α
xo ,
where Sxo and Dxo represent the channel gain resulting from
Rayleigh fading and the distance from the transmitter at x to
the typical receiver at o (the origin), respectively. The channel
gain from Rayleigh fading Sxo is exponentially distributed
with unit mean, i.e., Sxo ∼ Exp (1).
The total interference seen by the typical receiver is IT +IJ .
Since IT and IJ are two independent shot noise processes,
by [14], the Laplace transform of the probability density
function (p.d.f.) of IT + IJ is given by
LIT+IJ (ζ)=exp
(
−λlCαG
2
α
N
(
P
2
α
T +(N−1)1−
2
α P
2
α
J
)
ζ
2
α
)
,
where
Cα := pi Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
,
with Γ (·) denote the gamma function.
The channel gain resulting from Rayleigh fading between
the typical transmitter and the typical receiver is denoted as
So ∼ Exp (1). The SIR at the typical receiver is given by
SIRo = GPTSor
−α (IT + IJ)
−1
.
For a given codeword rate Rb, a threshold SIR value for
connection outage is defined as βb = 2Rb −1. The connection
outage probability is then given by
pco =Pr (SIRo ≤ βb) (1)
= 1−Pr
(
So ≥ βbr
α
GPT
(IT + IJ)
)
= 1−LIT+IJ
(
βbr
α
GPT
)
= 1−exp
(
−β
2
α
b λlCαr
2
N
(
1+(N−1)1− 2α (φ−1−1) 2α)) .
Remark: For a given power allocation ratio, it can be
mathematically shown that with a reasonable path-loss ex-
ponent, i.e., α = 2 ∼ 4, the connection outage probability
decreases when extra transmit sectors are added. The im-
provement comes from two aspects: i) the intended sectors
shrink and thus the legitimate receivers are interfered by less
information signals; ii) the power allocated to the artificial
noise is distributed in more sectors and thus the legitimate
receivers are interfered by relatively less artificial noise.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Here, we derive the secrecy outage probability pso to
measure the possibility that the transmitted message is not per-
fectly secure against the eavesdroppers. To this end, we focus
on a typical transmitter-receiver pair and put the transmitter at
the origin. According to the assumption made in Section II-A,
the interference at the eavesdroppers consists of the artificial
noise only. The transmitters which are radiating artificial
noise toward the eavesdropper at z form a homogeneous
PPP ΦJ with density N−1N λl [16]. The interference seen by
the eavesdropper at z is given by
IJ =
GPJ
N − 1
∑
x∈ΦJ
SxzD
−α
xz ,
where Sxz ∼ Exp (1) and Dxz represent the channel gain
resulting from Rayleigh fading and the distance from the
transmitter at x to the eavesdropper at z, respectively.
By [14], the Laplace transform of p.d.f. of IJ is given by
LIJ (ζ) = exp
(
−λlCαG
2
α
N
(N − 1)1− 2α P 2αJ ζ
2
α
)
.
With wiretap coding, the message from the typical trans-
mitter is not perfectly secure against the eavesdropper at z if
the channel from the typical transmitter to the eavesdropper
at z can support a data rate larger than the added rate
redundancy, i.e., log2(1 + SIRz) > Re, where SIRz denotes
the SIR received by the eavesdropper at z. With sectorized
transmission, only the eavesdroppers inside the intended sector
of the typical transmitter may cause secrecy outage. Though
those eavesdroppers form a fan-shaped PPP, by Mapping
Theorem [16], they can be mapped as a homogeneous PPP on
the whole plane, which is denoted as ΦZ with density 1N λe.
The SIR received by the eavesdropper at z is given by
SIRz = GPTSozD
−α
oz I
−1
J ,
where Soz ∼ Exp (1) and Doz represent the channel gain
resulting from Rayleigh fading and the distance from the
typical transmitter at o (the origin) to the eavesdropper at z.
For a given rate redundancy Re, a threshold SIR value for
secrecy outage is defined as βe = 2Re − 1. By taking the
complement of the probability that the transmitted message is
perfectly secure against all eavesdroppers, the secrecy outage
probability can be expressed as
pso = 1− EΦJ
{
EΦZ
{ ∏
z∈ΦZ
Pr (SIRz < βe|ΦJ)
}}
(2)
= 1− EΦJ
{
exp
(
−λe
N
∫
R2
Pr (SIRz > βe|ΦJ) dz
)}
,
where the 2nd line is obtained by applying the probability
generating functional of a PPP (see Definition A.5 in [16]).
While a closed-form expression seems not available, we
invoke the bounding technique used in [5], i.e., applying
Jensen’s inequality, to give the following upper bound:
pso ≤ 1− exp
(
−λe
N
∫
R2
Pr (SIRz > βe) dz
)
= 1− exp
(
−λe
N
∫
R2
LIJ
(
βeD
α
oz
GPT
)
dz
)
= 1− exp
(
−
pi
Cα
λe
λl
β
2
α
e (N − 1)1−
2
α (φ−1 − 1) 2α
)
= pUBso . (3)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Power Allocation Ratio,  φ
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
,  p
so
 
 
Simulation
Upper Bound
 N = 3, 4, 5
Fig. 1. The secrecy outage probability versus the power allocation ratio for
different numbers of transmit sectors. Results are shown for the case where
α = 4, λl = 0.01, λe = 0.001, Re = 1 and βe = 1.
As shown in Fig. 1, the upper bound in (3) gives a
very accurate approximation for the actual secrecy outage
probability. From (3), we made the following observations:
Remark: For a given power allocation ratio, the secrecy
outage probability can be reduced by adding extra transmit
sectors. This result follows the intuition that by adding transmit
sectors: i) the intended sector shrinks and thus less eaves-
droppers may cause secrecy outage; ii) the artificial noise
from other transmitters covers a larger region and thus more
eavesdroppers are degraded. Moreover, as we may expect,
the secrecy outage probability decreases if more legitimate
transmitter-receiver pairs are deployed, since the reception at
the eavesdroppers are degraded more severely.
IV. SECRECY THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the networkwide throughput in
terms of the secrecy transmission capacity, which measures
the maximal achievable rate of successful transmission of
confidential messages per unit area [5].
For a given pair of outage constraints, pco = σ and pso = ,
the secrecy transmission capacity is defined as
C = (1− σ)λlRs
= (1− σ)λl [Rb −Re]+ , (4)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}, σ determines Rb, while  deter-
mines Re.
From (1), letting pco = σ and recalling that βb = 2Rb − 1,
the supported codeword rate Rb is
Rb = log2
1 +
 NλlCαr2 ln
(
1
1−σ
)
1 + (N − 1)1− 2α (φ−1 − 1) 2α

α
2
 . (5)
From (3), letting pUBso =  and recalling that βe = 2
Re − 1,
an upper bound to the required rate redundancy Re can be
found as
RUBe =log2
1+
 piCα λeλl
ln
(
1
1−
)
(N−1)1−2α (φ−1−1) 2α
α2
 . (6)
With (5) and (6), a lower bound to the secrecy transmission
capacity in (4) is obtained as follows:
CLB = (1− σ)λl
[
Rb −RUBe
]+
= (1− σ)λl (7)
×
log2

1 +
(
N
λlCαr
2 ln( 11−σ )
1+(N−1)1− 2α (φ−1−1) 2α
)α
2
1 +
(
pi
Cα
λe
λl
ln( 11− )(N−1)1−
2
α (φ−1−1) 2α
)α
2


+
.
Since the upper bound in (3) tracks the exact secrecy outage
probability very closely, the lower bound in (7) provides a
very tight approximation to the actual secrecy transmission
capacity. From (7), we made the following observations:
Remark: The secrecy transmission capacity increases loga-
rithmically as the number of transmit sectors goes large. This
result comes from fact that under the outage constraints, as the
number of transmit sectors goes large, the supported codeword
rate in (5) increases logarithmically, while the required rate
redundancy in (6) diminishes.
A. Condition for Positive Secrecy Transmission Capacity
Here, we derive a sufficient condition, in terms of the system
parameters and outage constraints, under which a positive
secrecy transmission capacity is achievable.
From (7), a positive secrecy transmission capacity is
achieved if:
ln
(
1
1−σ
)
ln
(
1
1−
)
>
piλer
2
N
(
1+
1
(N−1)1−2α (φ−1−1) 2α
)
. (8)
Since the power allocation ratio φ satisfies 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, if
the following inequality stands:
ln
(
1
1− σ
)
ln
(
1
1− 
)
>
piλer
2
N
, (9)
then φ may always be adjusted such that the condition in (8)
is met. In other words, if the condition in (9) is satisfied, a
positive secrecy transmission capacity can always be achieved
by using a proper power allocation ratio.
Remark: Interestingly, as can be seen from the left-hand-
side of (9), the feasible region formed by pairs of (σ, ), with
which a positive secrecy transmission capacity is achievable, is
a symmetric function of the two outage constraints, σ and .
From the right-hand-side of (9), we know that adding extra
transmit sectors is an effective method to enlarge the feasible
region. Compared with the results in Corollary 1 of [5], the
artificial-noise-aided sectorized transmission proposed in this
paper expands the feasible region by a factor of the number of
transmit sectors N , even under a more stringent assumption
that the eavesdroppers can perform multi-user decoding.
B. Power Allocation Optimization
In this subsection, we optimize the power allocation be-
tween the information signal and the artificial noise to maxi-
mize the secrecy transmission capacity.
Remark: By properly factorizing the derivative of the
secrecy transmission capacity lower bound CLB in (7) w.r.t. the
power allocation ratio φ, it can be shown that by increasing φ,
the derivative is first positive and then negative. Hence, the
optimal power allocation ratio φ∗, which maximizes CLB, is
unique and can be found by solving the derivative, even if the
objective function is non-concave, as can be shown from (7).
For the case where α = 4, setting the derivative of CLB
w.r.t. φ to zero gives a cubic equation and solving it provides
a closed-form expression for φ∗. Here, we skip the details for
space limitation and present the results directly.
Define:
%=
N
λlCαr2
ln
(
1
1−σ
)
, ς=
1
ln
(
1
1−
) pi
Cα
λe
λl
,
κ=%2+ς2+
(
%2−ς2+
√
((%−ς)2+1)((%+ς)2+1)
)(
%2−ς2) .
The optimal power allocation ratio for α = 4 is given by
φ∗α=4 =
1 + ς 23
(
2
2
3 %
4
3 ς
1
3κ
2
3 + 2
4
3 %2ς + 2%
2
3 ς
5
3κ
1
3
)2
4 (N − 1) % 43κ 23 (%2 − ς2)2

−1
.
Remark: As N →∞, we see that φ∗α=4 = 1−O
(
N−1
)
,
and similar asymptotic behavior can be observed when σ → 1.
In other words, the optimal power allocation ratio increases as
the number of transmit sectors goes large or as the connection
outage constraint becomes loose. The former observation can
be explained by noting that adding extra transmit sectors
allows the transmitter to concentrate more on the transmission
toward the intended receiver, and thus more transmit power
can be given to the information signal to achieve a better
throughput performance, while still satisfying the connection
and secrecy outage constraints.
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Fig. 2. Optimal power allocation ratio versus the number of transmit sectors
for different connection outage constraints. Results are shown for the case
where α = 3, r = 1,  = 0.01, λl = 0.01 and λe = 0.001.
Fig. 2 depicts the optimal power allocation ratio versus the
number of transmit sectors with α = 3. As can be seen,
the observations made from the case α = 4 holds more
generally. Numerical results also indicate that with optimal
power allocation, the secrecy transmission capacity increases
logarithmically as the number of transmit sectors goes large,
which agrees with our earlier observation made from (7).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we combined sectorized transmission with
artificial noise to enhance the secrecy performance in decen-
tralized wireless networks. After characterizing the secrecy
transmission capacity, we provided a sufficient condition for
achieving a positive secrecy transmission capacity and investi-
gated the optimal power allocation for maximizing the secrecy
transmission capacity. The analytical results indicates that with
sectorized transmission, significant secrecy enhancements can
be achieved. Note that sectorized transmission only requires
to know the direction of the intended receiver. If the channel
knowledge of the intended receiver is available at the transmit-
ter, artificial-noise-aided beamforming [9] can be employed to
exploit the benefits of having multiple transmit antennas, and
it is currently under investigation.
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